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Abstract 
Purpose: The introduction of financial fair play regulations in 2011 was accompanied by 
criticism that they would have an adverse effect on competitive balance in European 
football. Counter-points were also expressed, suggesting that the opposite would occur; that 
they would actually increase competitive balance through reducing the importance of 
financial power. The lack of clarity and cohesion on this issue prompted this study, which 
examines the effect FFP has had on competitive balance in the English Premier League.  
Design: The analysis conducted uses the Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance as the 
primary method, and is supported by standard deviation of points analysis and a Scully-Noll 
ratio analysis, which together provide an indication of the level of competitive balance for 
each of the past 21 seasons, from 1995/96 to 2015/16. This examination allows for the 
trends in competitive balance to be identified, with emphasis drawn on the seasons after the 
introduction of the regulations.  
Findings: The results provide no indication that FFP regulations have resulted in a decline in 
competitive balance in the EPL, instead hinting that a positive effect may have been caused. 
This positive effect exceeds the primary aim of the regulations and underlines their 
importance in the future stability of club football. 
Originality/value: While underlining the need for further research on the topic, this study 
provides the first insights to the effects of FFP regulations on competitive balance in the EPL. 
These insights would support the view that FFP initiatives have begun to shift the focus of 
sporting competition away from financial strength towards more natural means of 
competition such as efficiency, innovation and good management. 
Keywords: 
Club football, European football, football finance, sport financial management  
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Introduction 
 
There exists a growing concern about the financial plight of European club football, which, 
despite ever-increasing revenues, continually fails to collectively break-even (Storm and 
Nielsen, 2012). Europe’s top-division clubs combined produced €13.2 billion in revenue for 
the financial year of 2011, yet the same 734 clubs made a combined net loss of €1.7 billion 
for the same period (UEFA, 2011; Franck, 2014). Net losses among the 734 clubs increased 
by 760% over the five-year period between 2006 and 2011 (Franck and Lang, 2013), with 
55% of clubs reporting net losses in 2011 (UEFA, 2011). Further, 38% of clubs are in a state 
of negative equity, with debt levels exceeding the value of club assets (Franck, 2014). 
It is against this backdrop that financial regulations were implemented across Europe, 
initiated by UEFA’s (Union of European Football Associations) own Financial Fair Play (FFP) 
regulations. Such regulations provide a means through which to introduce discipline and 
rationality to European club football finances to help safeguard the stability of European 
football (UEFA, 2015). 
Despite the good intentions of FFP, criticism exists about the regulations, particularly 
regarding suggestions that financial regulations will have an adverse effect on the 
competitive balance within European football (Lindholm, 2010; Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 
2014). This issue has gained significant attention in the literature to date and yet it still 
warrants further analysis. Consequently, it is the intention of this study to investigate this 
line of argument in order to determine if it holds any justification. This study will employ a 
methodology of three different statistical measures (the Herfindahl Index, Scully-Noll ratio, and standard 
deviation of points) in an attempt to produce a set of results which can offer an insight into the 
effects FFP regulations have had on the competitive balance in the English Premier League. 
The results should also provide insights into the trends in competitive balance in the EPL, 
facilitating further discussion and analysis on the subject of competitive balance.   
The article is organized into five sections. Following this introduction, the theoretical 
foundations of this study are discussed, before its research design is examined. Next, the 
study’s findings will be presented in detail, while investigating the effects of FFP on 
competitive balance. Finally, the implications of the conclusions to emerge from this 
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research are discussed, as well as some recommendations for future research on the 
subject. 
 
Theoretical background 
 
This section will explore the existing body of literature on the subjects of competitive 
balance and financial fair play in order to provide the foundations upon which this study was 
conducted. The review will begin with the concept of competitive balance as it is the central 
theme underpinning this research. 
A central element to any sporting contest is the concept of competitive balance; the notion 
that “competitors must be of approximate equal ‘size’ if any are to be successful” 
(Rottenberg, 1956, p. 242). Competitive balance is based upon the premise that sporting 
contests must contain elements of unpredictability and have an uncertain outcome in order 
to provide entertainment value for spectators (Humphreys, 2002; Késenne, 2007). What is 
being argued, is that in contrast to traditional economic theory, the sport ‘product’ is an 
indivisible, joint-production between the participating teams within a particular league, 
dependent upon the cooperation and input of every team (Morrow, 2003; Goossens, 2006; 
Lee and Fort, 2012). Whereas in business the ideal is to achieve a monopolistic position over 
the competition (as far as the law permits), in sport “pure monopoly is a disaster” because 
sports teams need opponents of comparable strength to compete against (Neale, 1964, p. 
2).  
Competitive balance is a topic that has stirred on-going debates within academia regarding 
its relation with league organisation and club focus. The former has been explored through 
the study of potential factors of influence, such as gate and TV revenue sharing (Feess and 
Stähler, 2009; Grossmann et al., 2010), talent distribution (Kesenne, 2006; Winfree and Fort, 
2012), salary caps (Dietl et al., 2011a), promotion – relegation system (Andreff, 2011), 
investment regulations and taxes (Brandes and Franck, 2007; Dietl et al., 2010), number of 
opponents, and participation in international competitions (Pawlowski et al., 2010). The 
relations developed both among these factors and between them and competitive balance 
have attracted contradicting views, while their effects have also been linked with the 
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discussion on the profit versus win maximisation focus of each club (Dietl et al., 2009; 2011b; 
Madden, 2015).  
As a result, measuring competitive balance is also considered an area of disagreement 
amongst academics. A number of methods for measuring competitive balance within sports 
leagues have been proposed, varying based on the nature and rules of the league (closed or 
open, introduction of taxes, revenue sharing, see Brandes and Franck, 2006; 2007), the rules 
of game (possibility of a draw, see Michie and Oughton, 2004) and the talent distribution 
rules (open or closed market, salary caps see Szymanski and Kuypers, 2000) of the league. 
Among the many measures of competitive balance are; the Herfindahl Index of Competitive 
Balance (Michie and Oughton, 2004; Pawlowski et al., 2010), standard deviation of points 
(Koning, 2000; Szymanski and Kuypers, 2000), and the Scully-Noll ratio (Cain and Haddock, 
2006; Lee and Fort, 2012), all of which will be discussed in the methodology section of this 
study. 
While a clear and unanimously accepted answer to the on-going debates surrounding 
competitive balance has yet to be found, what is evident through the literature, is that the 
dynamics of competition in club football have now created an environment in which 
financial resources are increasingly more important as a competitive driver (Franck, 2010). 
Wealth is the currency with which playing and managerial talent is purchased, therefore 
financial resources have become an integral antecedent to success, suggesting that 
European club football has developed into a win-maximisation environment, leaving behind 
the model of profit-maximisation which previously dominated European football, and 
remains the most popular ownership model in US sports (Wilson et al., 2013; Franck, 2014). 
It is for this reason that financial resources in club football are commonly mismanaged and 
misused, spawning a great deal of concern over the future of European club football and its 
lack of function efficiency focus (Wilson et al., 2013). 
The situation is concerning for two primary reasons; firstly, it has created a financially 
unstable and volatile environment which could ultimately threaten the long-term viability of 
European club football (Lago et al., 2006; Franck, 2014). In English football alone, between 
1962 and 2009 there were 96 recorded cases of insolvency among 79 different clubs, with 
thirteen clubs facing multiple instances of financial collapse (Beech et al., 2008). Insolvency 
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continues to afflict English football with the most high-profile instance involving Leeds 
United entering administration in 2007. Having mortgaged the club’s future income on the 
gamble of continued qualification to the UEFA Champions League, Leeds United failed to 
qualify in 2002 and were consequently left with large amounts of unserviceable debt 
(Morrow, 2003; Grundy, 2004). By the time Leeds United entered administration in 2007, 
the club was playing football in the third division, with debts having peaked at £120 million 
along the way (Buraimo et al., 2006). 
Administration is a favoured option among football clubs facing insolvency as it is a process 
designed to help ailing businesses rather than punish them (Beech et al., 2008; Szymanski, 
2012). Administration proceedings grant administrators temporary control of the indebted 
business in order to restructure the company finances, with the aim of finding a way to 
repay creditors as fully as possible (Best, 2011). Following an agreeable debt settlement, the 
business is permitted to restart anew if it remains commercially viable, thus avoiding the 
need for the total liquidation of the business and all of its assets (Beech, 2010). 22 Football 
League clubs alone experienced administration between 1999 and 2004, almost a quarter of 
the 92 clubs that comprise the Football League (Buraimo et al., 2006). Administration allows 
clubs to write-off or significantly reduce the level of their debts, thus providing a platform 
from which to start anew without the burden of debt. This inevitably results in the creditors 
of football clubs being left short-changed, effectively subsidising the irresponsible financial 
behaviour of clubs without any choice in the matter due to the social and cultural 
importance of football clubs (Szymanski, 2012). The survival of football clubs is viewed as 
highly desirable and as such there is a reluctance, particularly among state creditors, to call 
in overdrafts and overdue bills in recognition of the potential wider social problems that 
could be triggered (Buraimo et al., 2006; Beech et al., 2008). 
Fully cognisant of the special regard in which they are held, football clubs have taken to 
exploiting their unique positions of power in the knowledge that they are effectively insured 
against financial failure by the state (Franck, 2014). The expectation of ex post support is a 
characteristic of soft budget constraints, a concept developed to describe the state support 
typically received by loss-making firms in socialist economies, but which also applies to most 
public sector institutions and the banking and finance sectors (Storm and Nielsen, 2012). 
Such soft budget constraints are also in evidence in European football, contributing to the 
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creation of a culture in which clubs believe they are too big, and too important to fail (Preuss 
et al., 2014). It is currently the case that a substantial number of European football clubs are 
technically bankrupt, with the EPL less than a year from bankruptcy when evaluated as a 
‘normal’ business (AT Kearney, 2010; Franck, 2014). 
The second major concern is the increasing prevalence of ‘financial doping’, the practice of 
relying on significant funding from external benefactors in order to cover perpetual losses, 
thus gaining a financial advantage over the competition (Muller et al., 2012). These external 
benefactors, or ‘sugar daddies’, invest enormous amounts of money into clubs and become 
their owners, typically for the prestige and utility associated with sporting success, and with 
little or no regard for the financial losses such endeavours require (Lang et al., 2011). It is 
now the case that over half of Europe’s top-division clubs are perpetual loss-makers, 
spending money they do not have (Beech et al., 2008). The application of the term ‘doping’ 
to this context is indicative of clubs’ attempts to gain an illegitimate advantage through the 
artificial manipulation of the natural competitiveness inherent in sport (Schubert and 
Kӧnecke, 2015). The consequence of this phenomenon has been the negative distortion of 
competitive balance both within and between European leagues (Schubert and Kӧnecke, 
2015). The competitive balance within each of Europe’s top five leagues has been declining 
since the turn of the millennium, coinciding with the huge increases in domestic and 
Champions League prize money (Curran et al., 2009; Pawlowski et al., 2010; Lee and Fort, 
2012). UEFA now distributes as much as €1 billion per season among the participants of each 
year’s Champions League tournament on a pro-rata basis, but over the last decade half of all 
Champions League money has been distributed among just ten clubs (Szymanski, 2014). 
Furthermore, the market value of the smallest teams from each of the top five divisions 
during the 2006/07 season was far below €50 million, whereas a number of the most 
valuable clubs had a market value well in excess of €300 million (Frick, 2007; Pawlowski et 
al., 2010).  Among Europe’s top five leagues only the Spanish League has a lower competitive 
balance than the EPL, a symptom of the huge financial rewards on offer in English football 
(Goossens, 2006; Hann et al., 2007; Naghshbandi et al., 2011). 
The phenomenon of ‘financial doping’ developed in response to the increasing financial 
rewards offered in European football, greatly increasing the incentives for success. The 
situation that has developed since has seen clubs spending beyond their financial means, 
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incurring huge debts as they are locked into an inflationary spiral of ever increasing transfer 
fees and salaries as they chase sporting success and the financial rewards that result (Hill, 
2011). According to Kesenne (2006) and Solberg and Haugen (2010), it is the win-maximising 
nature of European football clubs that has made clubs irresponsible and profligate in their 
spending behaviour, as they seek to fulfil their single-minded objectives of sporting success 
by any means necessary. This destructive ‘arms race’ (Franck, 2010) that has developed sees 
clubs risking their long-term financial health in order to achieve short-term sporting success 
(Storm and Nielsen, 2012; Schubert and Kӧnecke, 2015). In such an environment the 
sporting competitiveness of a club is not determined by its profitability or financial liquidity, 
but by its spending power (Franck, 2010; 2014). Beech et al (2008) go so far as to suggest 
that administration has become a legitimate business tactic for clubs looking to spend their 
way to sporting success, entirely neglecting the fundamental elements of a profit-
maximisation or function efficiency strategy that aim to ensure the financial stability and 
sustainability of a firm (Wilson et al., 2013). 
It is against these rising concerns that UEFA introduced its own Financial Fair Play 
regulations, designed to regulate the financial behaviour of clubs competing in UEFA club 
competitions. Whilst there are 734 top-division clubs across Europe, only 235 each season 
qualify to play in UEFA competitions and as such UEFA’s FFP regulations only ever apply to 
235 of the 734 top-division clubs each season (Szymanski, 2014). As a result, the EPL, 
Football League, and numerous other national associations across Europe have since 
implemented their own variations of financial regulations to ensure that all clubs are obliged 
to adhere to certain financial standards (Hill, 2011). 
UEFA’s FFP regulations are intended to: encourage responsible spending, protect the 
creditors of clubs, and encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, all of 
which contribute to the overarching objective of protecting the long-term viability and 
sustainability of European club football (UEFA, 2015). These objectives are to be achieved 
through two mechanisms of the regulations; the no overdue payables rule and the break- 
even rule (Peeters and Szymanski, 2013). The no overdue payables rule is designed to 
protect against the non-payment and delayed payment of liabilities by clubs to their 
employees, social and tax authorities, and other football clubs. This element of the 
regulations will bring football clubs in line with standard business practice and serve to 
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protect creditors from becoming involuntary investors in clubs (Szymanski, 2014). 
Compliance with the break-even rule is also necessary, requiring clubs to balance their 
expenses and income (UEFA, 2015). Whilst there are some exceptions to this rule 
(Szymanski, 2014), and a transitional period during which an ‘acceptable deviation’ is 
permitted, the break-even rule will eventually require clubs to balance their books 
completely in order to be admitted into UEFA club competitions. The various other 
adaptations of financial fair play regulations in place across Europe differ slightly in their 
specific details but all are derived from UEFA’s FFP regulations and are therefore built upon 
the same legal framework.  
Despite the concerns surrounding European football which led to the introduction of 
financial regulations, and the active involvement of clubs in seeking out these changes 
(Geey, 2011), financial fair play regulations, and UEFA’s FFP regulations in particular, have 
received a number of criticisms. Critiques have centred around: the legality of FFP 
regulations (Long, 2012; Peeters and Szymanski, 2013; Szymanski, 2014); the belief that FFP 
regulations will cause a reduction in the quality of all teams (Drut and Raballand, 2012; 
Madden, 2012); the belief that FFP regulations will create an unnecessary downward 
pressure on players’ wages (Dietl et al., 2009; Peeters and Szymanski, 2012; Preuss et al., 
2014); and the fact that such regulations will prevent the industry from benefiting from 
substantial injections of external financing (Madden, 2012; Franck, 2014). 
However, the criticism that has gained most attention among academics relates to the 
negative effects that such strict financial regulations could have on competitiveness. The 
break-even requirement is viewed as being analogous to a relative salary cap, whereby each 
club is constrained in its spending power by its own market potential, thus making it difficult 
for smaller clubs to compete (Lindholm, 2010; Sass, 2012). The effect would be to further 
entrench the existing hierarchy of European club football, strengthening the power of the 
wealthiest clubs by restraining the smaller clubs (Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014). This 
argument is based upon the premise that spending power provides the true competitive 
advantage in football, making it “almost impossible to catch-up to the bigger clubs without 
external funding” (Vopel, 2013, p. 17). Nevertheless, Franck (2014) offers an alternative 
view, suggesting that FFP restores the incentives for good management and innovation, 
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providing a more reliable way to disrupt the established hierarchy. Furthermore, Franck 
(2014) proposes that limiting clubs to their own market potential will actually serve to 
reduce the competitive gap between favourites and underdogs by restricting the advantage 
bigger clubs can gain from benefactor money. 
It is the case that European football has always been characterised by a competitive 
imbalance, with most leagues having been dominated historically by no more than three or 
four teams (Peeters and Szymanski, 2013). Furthermore, the competitive balance within 
European football has been in decline ever since the 1990s, affecting both intra-league and 
inter-league competitiveness (Pawlowski et al., 2010). As of 2012, the number of titles won 
by the three most successful clubs in each of Europe’s top five leagues had risen to 77%, but 
this is only a modest increase from the figure of 71% for the period 1971-1991 (Peeters and 
Szymanski, 2013). The competitive state of European football prior to FFP provided no 
evidence to suggest a reversal in the negative trend of competitive balance was forthcoming. 
Thus, whilst the FFP regulations detail no specific objective or intention of addressing the 
issue of competitive imbalance within European football (Lindholm, 2010), the regulations 
serve to shake-up the rules and disrupt the status-quo (Franck, 2014). The status-quo was 
characterised by a disequilibrium in competition and a volatile financial situation, and FFP 
serves at least to introduce discipline and rationality to European football, and shift the 
focus of competition from external financial injections to good management and efficiency. 
This should ultimately narrow the avenues for gaining instant success through cash 
injections, encouraging more organic investment and growth (Geey, 2011).  
Despite the conjecture on this subject, no analysis has yet been carried out to assess the 
level of competitive balance in the EPL since the implementation of financial regulations. 
Therefore, it is difficult to reliably evaluate what impact, if any, such regulations have had on 
competitive balance. In the absence of any evidence it is difficult to assess the credibility of 
such conjecture, and thus improper to pass any judgement on the potential impacts or 
effectiveness of FFP regulations. For this reason, the present study will carry out an analysis 
of the competitive balance in the EPL over the past 21 seasons, in order to deliver a clearer 
understanding of the competitive balance trends and effects of the FFP regulations over 
recent years. 
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Methodology 
 
As the review of the literature surrounding FFP regulations in European football has 
highlighted, there exist a number of arguments suggesting that the introduction of these 
regulations will reduce the competitive balance in European club football, and in 
particular, the Premier League. It is therefore the intention of this research to investigate 
the value of such claims through an analysis of the relevant data in order to either 
substantiate or reject the theory that FFP has a negative effect on competitive balance in 
the Premier League. 
Competitive balance is a measure of the relative performance of every team within a 
particular sports league, used to give an indication of how evenly-matched the teams are 
(Goossens, 2006). There is no one single measure of competitive balance, with the 
appropriate measures varying depending on the rules, structure and format of the 
sporting competition in question. This research will be conducted on the basis of the points 
totals of each team at the end of every season as this metric provides the most accurate 
indication of overall performance (Evans, 2014). The Premier League awards teams one 
point for a drawn match and three points for a victory (Premier League, 2015), therefore 
any metric used here must incorporate both wins and draws to be considered a valid 
measure of overall performance. Equally, league position is determined by the number of 
points each team collects over the duration of the season, with the team with the highest 
points total winning the league (Premier League, 2015), thus it is logical to assess 
performance based upon the same metric. 
Nevertheless, points are not the only metric that can be used to assess relative 
performance; win percentage, goals scored, goals conceded, goal difference and league 
position can all be employed as proxies for performance. Win percentage is commonly 
used to assess performance in North American sports, as they typically function on a win-
loss basis, playing out every game to a victory to avoid tied games (see Scully, 1989; Quirk 
and Fort, 1992). The number of goals scored and/or conceded by a team can provide 
some useful information about the relative performance of a team, but as a standalone 
indicator of performance it can be misleading. Match results, and therefore points, are not 
determined by the total number of goals scored and conceded but instead by the number 
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of goals scored relative to the opposition in each given match, thus scoring lots of goals or 
conceding few does not guarantee victory or the collection of any points. Lastly, the use of 
league position as an indicator of performance can also be misrepresentative, as league 
position does not provide any indication of the relative points difference between each 
position. It is the points-based system that best encapsulates the overall and relative 
performance of every team within a league of this nature (Evans, 2014). 
The Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance will be employed as the primary measure of 
competitive balance in this study, but in order to ensure robustness the results will be 
cross-examined with two other measures of competitive balance: standard deviation of 
points, and the Scully-Noll ratio. The Herfindahl Index is a measure developed to assess 
the inequalities that exist between all of the firms in a given industry, and it has since 
been adapted as a means by which to analyse the competitiveness of sports leagues 
(Michie and Oughton, 2004; Brandes and Franck, 2006). When analysing a sports league 
of the format of the Premier League, the market share variable is substituted for each 
club’s share of points, as points are the currency with which performance and success are 
measured in the EPL.   
Regarding the other two measures to be employed, both are based on standard deviation 
calculations. The standard deviation of points measure provides a statistical measure of 
the distribution of points among each club relative to the average points total for the 
league (Goossens, 2006). The Scully-Noll ratio builds on the results produced by the 
standard deviation of points analysis by comparing the actual standard deviation value for 
each season with an idealised standard deviation figure based on a theoretical league that 
is equally balanced (Noll, 1988; Scully, 1989; Lee and Fort, 2005). 
Competitive balance values will be produced for each of the past 21 Premier League 
seasons, starting with the 1995/96 season, through to the 2015/16 season, using each of 
the three methods listed above. The 1995/96 season was chosen as the starting point of 
the data set because it was the first season to feature just twenty teams, in line with the 
format of the league at present. Both the Herfindahl Index and standard deviation 
calculations are a function of the number of teams in a league, therefore it is important 
that the league format remains consistent throughout the dataset to ensure the reliability 
of the results (Michie and Oughton, 2004). With a representative and comparable statistic 
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for each season it will then be possible to compare the results over the 21-year period to 
identify any trends that may have occurred. In particular, a comparison of data before and 
after the introduction of FFP in 2011. 
The results of this analysis will also be complimented by a measure of the range between 
the total number of points for the top-ranked team and the bottom-ranked team, 
providing a simple indication of the spread of points in the league. Whilst the range 
measure takes no account of the concentration of data between the highest and lowest 
data points and therefore should not be employed in isolation, it does provide an 
alternative indication of competitive balance, which can be utilised alongside the three 
aforementioned primary measures to provide a more representative overall impression of 
competitive balance (see Appendix C). 
Financial fair play regulations have only been in effect since the start of the 2011/12 
season and therefore there is only five seasons worth of data to analyse. The introduction 
of FFP has been staggered over a number of seasons so as to assist clubs with the 
transition to the new regulations. Consequently, there has been limited time for the FFP 
regulations to have an effect on the competitive balance within the Premier League, be it 
positively or negatively. Since the introduction of FFP regulations in 2011 all clubs will 
have had to begin the process of bringing their club finances in line with the new 
regulations, yet acceptable levels of deviation from the break-even requirement are still 
permitted, and thus the full effects of FFP may not be truly felt until the acceptable 
deviation level is lowered to zero. 
Equally, the unpredictable nature of sport, and particularly of European club football 
means that there are naturally fluctuations in club performance levels every year 
(Buraimo et al., 2007), and therefore it could be difficult to differentiate between the 
natural fluctuations in competitive balance and any changes that may have occurred due 
to the introduction of FFP. Even if the results were to suggest a noticeable shift in 
competitive balance has occurred since the introduction of FFP, it will be difficult to 
attribute this change directly and solely to FFP with full confidence as there are many 
other factors that can potentially impact upon competitive balance. Nevertheless, 
examining the trends in competitive balance and any effects the FFP regulations might 
have had in the PL can provide valuable insights for the future of European club football 
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and its management.  
 
Findings and discussion 
After data from the 21 PL seasons were collected from the official website (see Appendix 
A - Premier League, 2016a), they were analysed using the Herfindahl Index, Scully-Noll 
ratio and Standard Deviation of points, to provide measures of competitive balance (see 
Appendix B). Based upon the share of total points each club achieves relative to the rest 
of the competition, the Herfindahl Index produces a figure to illustrate the depth of 
inequality that exists between the clubs of a league. In a twenty-team league such as the 
EPL, the Herfindhal Index results will fall within the range of 0.05 to 0.07, where 0.05 
represents a perfectly balanced league and 0.07 represents a perfectly unbalanced league 
(Michie and Oughton, 2004).   
Initial observations of the minimum, maximum and mean points values (Figure 1) and the points 
differentials (Figure 2) highlight the varied and unpredictable nature of football (Buraimo et 
al., 2007). As can be seen in the data, even though the EPL will always develop into a 
natural hierarchy, the absolute points totals can vary significantly between individual 
seasons. This serves to highlight that comparisons made on an individual season basis can 
be limited, with long-term trends proving much more revealing and representative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Minimum, maximum and mean points values 
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Figure 2: Points differentials (winning margin and last 
place margin) 
 
 
This becomes clear when examining the range calculations, which measure the point 
differential between first position and twentieth (last) position. Figure 3 shows how varied 
the range can be from season to season, with a low of 41 points and a high of 76 points over 
the previous 21 seasons. It is interesting to note that the 76-point differential, achieved in 
2005/06 and 2007/08, is larger than the winning points total in 1996/97 (75 points), and 
larger than the points totals of second-placed teams on four occasions. In light of the fact 
that Sunderland FC finished bottom of the league in 2005/06 and had the league’s lowest 
market value (€36,550,000), while Chelsea FC won the league with the highest market value 
(€366,075,000), the 76-point differential between the two teams appears more 
understandable (Frick, 2007). The fact that Watford FC finished bottom of the league the 
following season with a market value of just €20,800,000 and Chelsea FC (€404,775,000) 
finished second highlights the sheer importance of financial strength as a driver of 
competition (Frick, 2007; Franck, 2010). When wealth is such a key factor in sporting success 
it encourages risky and irresponsible financial behaviour as clubs seek any means by which 
to win (Franck and Lang, 2013). The over-inflated importance and misuse of financial 
resources are the two primary areas that FFP regulations are aimed at addressing (Muller et 
al., 2012). 
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Figure 3: Points range (1st to 20th position) 
 
 
When the range is analysed using a three-season moving average (see Figure 4) trends 
emerge more clearly as the data spikes are smoothed out. Figure 4 illustrates a clear upward 
trend in the range between 1996/97 and 2005/06, increasing from 41 points in 1996/97 to 
76 points in 2005/06. From the peak of 2005/06 there has been more of a downward trend 
in the range, although this trend is much less smooth – a result of considerable fluctuations 
every season between 2005/06 and 2011/12. A downward trend in range is desirable as it 
provides evidence of a closer concentration of the data, although in isolation it is an 
inadequate measure of competitive balance. However, the range results, combined with the 
maximum and minimum points totals, can help to allay concerns that FFP will reduce the 
quality of the EPL overall (Madden, 2012). The average winning points total over the five 
seasons since the introduction of FFP (86.4 points) has been marginally higher than the 
average for the entire data set (85.5 points), whilst the average range and bottom-ranked 
points totals for the past five seasons have also been within two points of the 21-season 
average (1.85 points and 0.93 points respectively). The limited change in these numbers 
would indicate that there has been no significant change in the overall quality of the EPL, 
counter to concerns expressed by Madden (2012). 
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Figure 4: Points range (three-season moving average) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Herfindahl Index values 
 
 
The Herfindahl Index results (see Figure 5) suggest there has been a general decline in 
competitive balance in the EPL since 1995/96, supporting existing research in this field 
(Michie and Oughton, 2004; Goossens, 2006; Pawlowski et al., 2010). The Herfindahl Index 
results are supported by a set of analogous results from both the Scully-Noll ratio and the 
standard deviation analysis (see Appendix D). From 1996/97 through to 2007/08 there is 
an undeniable upward trend in Herfindahl Index values, with the results increasing from 
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0.052659 (the lowest data point) to 0.056842 (the highest data point). This negative trend 
in competitive balance can at least in part be attributed to the sizable financial disparities 
that developed between clubs during this period, caused by vast increases in prize money 
being awarded for sporting success, as Drut and Raballand (2012) and Lee and Fort (2012) 
argue. The phenomenon of money coming to money and the absence of any true revenue 
sharing mechanisms ensures that the wealthy and successful clubs earn a 
disproportionately large share of income, to the detriment of the remaining majority of 
clubs (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004; Lee and Fort, 2012). Pawlowski et al (2010) focused 
specifically on the effect that increases in UEFA Champions League payments had on 
competitive balance, producing a range of results that support the suggestion that the 
increase in financial rewards has led to a decrease in competitive balance in the EPL (and 
elsewhere in Europe). Goossens’ (2006) results also highlight the central role of 
Champions League payments in triggering a decline in competitive balance and creating a 
wealthy elite of clubs at the top of the league. Indeed, in three consecutive seasons 
between 2006/07 and 2008/09 the points differential between fourth and fifth position 
was eight points, eleven points and nine points respectively. Furthermore, over the ten-
year period from 1998/99 to 2007/08 only seven different teams finished in one of the 
top four league positions, and 85% of the time it was the same four teams that occupied 
these four positions (Curran et al., 2009). As Michie and Oughton (2004) and Vopel (2013) 
argue, this sign of ‘domination’ suggests that the EPL is functioning as an oligopoly that is 
difficult to challenge and almost impossible to sustain a challenge against, mainly due to 
the revenue rewarding nature of finishing in the top positions and subsequently qualifying 
for participation in European competitions (Pawlowski et al., 2012). 
After the peak value in 2007/08 the trend is more towards a general decline in Herfindahl 
Index values, although this incorporates four seasons of decline and four seasons of 
growth. The results show a fluctuation in the data almost every season, with a constant 
pattern of an increase in competitive balance followed by a decrease in competitive 
balance in the subsequent season, resulting in the high frequency of data spikes in Figure 
5. The major standout is the large, negative spike in 2010/11 - a figure of 0.052931 - which 
was a decline of 0.003387 from the previous year, and 0.002341 lower than the value for 
the season that followed. 0.052931 is the third-lowest value in the data set, and the lowest 
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figure since 1997/98, making it somewhat of an anomaly, particularly considering the 
seasonal values had not dropped below 0.054 since 2000/01, and have not done so since. 
A closer observation of the 2010/11 data illustrates why the Herfindahl Index value is so 
low (relative to the dataset). The 2010/11 season produced the third-lowest range figure in 
the dataset; this can be attributed to having the second-highest score for the bottom-
ranked team (33 points), and a relatively low winning points tally of 80, making the points 
differential just 47 points - twenty points fewer than the range for the previous season. 
Additionally, the mean number of points for the 2010/11 season was 51.45; eight clubs 
came within six points of the mean (7th to 14th position), and were separated by just eight 
points. Furthermore, the five clubs in positions fifteen through nineteen were separated by 
just four points, and together these thirteen clubs were separated by a total of just fifteen 
points – that is, 65% of the league’s clubs separated by just 32% of the total points range. 
This tight grouping of clubs has the effect of negating the impact of some of the larger 
points differentials present between certain clubs elsewhere in the league, such as the 
winning margin of nine points, the margin of six points between 4th and 5th position and 
19th and 20th position, and the five-point differential between 7th and 8th position (see 
Figure 6). That the league is incredibly close from 7th position through to 19th is indicative 
of the relative financial parity that exists below the exclusive group of ‘rich’ clubs at the top 
of the table, which secure an additional income from participating in European 
competitions (Pawlowski et al., 2010; Vopel, 2013). It is only at the summit of the table 
where the larger point-gaps emerge as the larger disparities in wealth are reflected in 
sporting performance, with further divisions between the rich and the mega-rich (Lang et 
al., 2011). Thus, whilst it is clear from the data that the 2010/11 season was relatively 
competitive (particularly in mid-table), the fact that larger point-gaps were present 
elsewhere in the league cannot be overlooked, and should be considered when viewing the 
Herfindahl Index value of 0.052931. 
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Figure 6: Point differential between each club (2010/11) 
 
Interestingly, this season of relatively high balance in competition was directly preceded by 
the peak period of imbalance, during which the Premier League experienced three of the 
five highest Herfindahl Index values in consecutive seasons. Additionally, the 2010/11 
season was the final season before the introduction of FFP regulations, thus it is possible 
that at least some of the increase in competitive balance can be attributed to 
readjustments made by clubs in preparation for the new regulations. 
UEFA’s FFP regulations were introduced at the start of the 2011/12 season, with the first 
assessment of the break-even requirement occurring after the 2012/13 season (UEFA, 2010). 
Under the current format the break-even requirement limits acceptable losses to €45 million 
for the first monitoring period1, €45 million for the second monitoring period, and €30 
million for the following three monitoring periods (UEFA, 2010). Whilst the Herfindahl Index 
values increased year-on-year during the first three seasons of FFP, the two subsequent 
seasons saw successive declines in Herfindahl Index values. The first monitoring period 
(covering the 2011/12 and 2012/13 seasons) coincided with a marginal decrease in 
competitive balance suggesting that the €45 million acceptable loss was too lenient to have 
much of an impact upon spending. The following season competitive balance decreased 
again, but more significantly this time, potentially a result of clubs maximising the remainder 
                                                          
1 UEFA monitoring periods fall at the end of every season and comprise the three seasons prior to the 
monitoring period date. The first monitoring period assesses just the first two seasons (2011/12 and 2012/13). 
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2015/16: Point differential between each club 
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of their €45 million allowance during the final year of the monitoring period. Following the 
first two monitoring periods the acceptable loss was reduced to €30 million, with the more 
stringent limitations coinciding with an increase in the competitive balance in the EPL. The 
tightening of UEFA’s regulations also coincided with the introduction of the EPL’s own 
financial fair play regulations, which limit clubs to aggregate losses of £105 million for every 
three-year period (Premier League, 2013). 
The 2014/15 and 2015/16 seasons saw a year-on-year increase in competitive balance – 
only the second occasion during the selected time period that the competitive balance 
values increased for two consecutive seasons. Additionally, the 2015/16 season produced 
the lowest Herfindahl Index score since 2003/04 (2010/11 anomaly aside), and returned to 
a score almost level with the first data point in 1995/96. It is worth noting that the 
Herfindahl Index value for 2015/16 has actually been distorted upwards by the large 
differentials at the top and bottom of the league (see Figure 7), without which the league 
would have been considered even more competitive than the 0.054244 Herfindahl Index 
value suggests. These results indicate that the FFP rules may be having some effect on the 
competitive balance within the Premier League, contributing to an increase in equality and 
competitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Point differential between each club (2015/16) 
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The defining feature of the 2015/16 season was the overall victory by Leicester City - only 
the sixth team to win the league in the EPL era, and the first first-time winner of the top-
division since Nottingham Forest’s victory in 1977/78. According to EPL data (Premier 
League, 2016b) 47 different teams have appeared in the EPL since 1992 and yet only six 
teams have been able to win the league title. Furthermore, twenty of the 24 EPL titles have 
been shared among just three clubs (Manchester United, Chelsea, Arsenal) demonstrating 
just how difficult it has traditionally been to break the stranglehold of the wealthy clubs at 
the top. Indeed, prior to the 2015/16 season, only six different clubs had featured in the top-
four of the EPL over the previous decade, with one of the three aforementioned clubs 
missing out on a spot in the top-four on just two occasions. However, more promisingly for 
the competitive balance of the EPL, the last four seasons have produced four different title 
winners and seven different teams have finished in the top-four. 
The fact that Leicester City had finished the previous season in 14th position with just 41 
points illustrates that upward mobility is becoming increasingly possible with clubs no longer 
frozen into the long-established hierarchy (Michie and Oughton, 2004). According to Curran 
et al. (2009), this change has been assisted by the continual increase in the value of 
broadcasting rights income in the EPL, making all clubs wealthier and reducing the relative 
disparity in income that has been an ever-present feature of the league in recent years. The 
2013 domestic broadcasting rights deal worth £3.018 billion made every EPL club much 
wealthier, while at the beginning of the 2016/17 season the new £5.136 billion deal will 
become active, reducing further the disparities in income between clubs (BBC, 2015). As of 
2014/15, seventeen EPL clubs were among the richest 30 clubs in world football (expected 
to include all twenty clubs after income from the new deal) and this has served to reduce the 
relative importance of absolute wealth (Deloitte, 2016). Whereas previously there existed a 
clear divide between rich and poor clubs in the EPL (see Michie and Oughton, 2004), now all 
clubs are relatively wealthy, vastly improving their individual competitive ability. 
Furthermore, it stands to reason that given the declining advantage that can be derived from 
wealth, other factors will assume more importance and act as competitive drivers in place of 
wealth. The emphasis will now be shifted towards efficiency, innovation and good 
management as they provide areas from which clubs can differentiate themselves and 
develop a competitive advantage (Wilson et al., 2013; Franck, 2014). These areas provide 
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means of natural growth and create a level platform from which all clubs compete with 
access to the same resources (Geey, 2011). The previous platform of competition, which 
prized financial wealth above all else, and placed no restrictions on the means of procuring 
financial resources, created an environment within which a select few clubs could create an 
hegemony and almost guarantee the permanence of the established order, thus 
perpetuating the win-maximisation environment that had been established (Lang et al., 
2011). Financial fair play regulations aim to ensure that it is no longer possible to maintain a 
position of dominance through artificial means, only through sporting merit.  
Concerns that the introduction of financial restrictions of this nature would inevitably have 
the effect of freezing clubs into the existing hierarchy based upon their current financial 
strength were understandable as this seemed unavoidable at the onset of FFP (Peeters and 
Szymanski, 2013; Sass, 2014). Nevertheless, the new competitive environment should make 
it possible and more realistic for clubs to challenge the existing hierarchy and achieve growth 
as success will no longer be so reliant upon the financial resources at a club’s disposal. 
The results presented in this section provide an insight into the changing nature of the 
competitive balance in the EPL over the previous two decades. Previous literature and the 
results produced here both highlight a negative trend in competitive balance in the EPL (see 
Lee and Fort, 2012), although the more recent results presented above indicate a potential 
break to this trend has begun to develop since 2011. If the trend continues as the literature 
and results presented suggest is possible, it could see the EPL entering a new and 
unexplored competitive balance era, transitioning away from the ‘Modern Period’ of 
reduced competitive balance examined by Lee and Fort (2012) into a new era of greater 
competition. The discussion above has drawn on these results to present some arguments 
that suggest the anticipated negative impact of FFP regulations on competitive balance (see 
Lindholm, 2010; Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014) has not materialised. At this point in time the 
criticisms of FFP appear unwarranted, with some indications from the results suggesting that 
FFP regulations are potentially having a positive effect on the competitive balance in the EPL. 
 
Conclusion 
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This study has undertaken an assessment of the effects of financial fair play regulations on 
the EPL. Literature on the topic highlights a number of criticisms that have been levelled at 
FFP regulations, which revolve around the legality and necessity of the regulations, and the 
potential side-effects such regulations could cause. In light of criticisms that FFP regulations 
would have adverse effects on the EPL, particularly regarding the competitive balance, this 
study took the opportunity to further investigate these arguments. With limited empirical 
data available at the time, the criticisms of FFP derived from theories, hypotheses, and 
extrapolations from similar situations in other sport and business contexts. However, with 
five seasons having now passed since the introduction of FFP there exists more data upon 
which an indicative analysis can now be based. 
The primary concern regarding FFP is that the regulations will cause a decline in competitive 
balance in the EPL (and elsewhere). This is based upon the premise that the regulations will, 
in effect, freeze the existing hierarchy and therefore preserve the status of the wealthy elite 
of clubs at the top of the league (Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014). ‘Freezing’ would occur 
because smaller clubs would no longer have access to external sources of financing, making 
it almost impossible to compete with bigger clubs in an environment where spending power 
is fundamental to success (Vopel, 2013). Critics argue that FFP would entrench the existing 
order, disproportionately benefiting the select few clubs that were able to take advantage of 
the prior lack of financial regulation in football. 
The results from this study help to illustrate the sheer imbalance that characterised 
European football prior to FFP regulations. The trend shows a gradual decrease in the 
competitive balance in the EPL over the decade preceding the introduction of FFP, with the 
literature highlighting these results as part of a long-term decline in competitive balance 
(Goossens, 2006). The EPL, like many European leagues, has been characterised by 
increasing levels of segregation, division and inequality between its member teams (Michie 
and Oughton, 2004). 
Having analysed data from the previous 21 EPL seasons, the results also suggest that there is 
little evidence to support the criticisms against FFP. Supportive data of these criticisms 
would have taken the form of an upward trend in the Herfindahl Index values since the 
introduction of FFP as this would be indicative of further decreases in competitive balance. 
However, the results produce no compelling evidence to suggest this has been the case, with 
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two seasons of decreasing competitive balance directly after the introduction of FFP, 
followed by two seasons of increasing competitive balance. The results from the two most 
recent seasons (2014/15 and 2015/16) suggest that perhaps the opposite is true, and that 
FFP is actually now having a positive impact on competitive balance by helping to shift the 
dynamics of competition away from spending power and towards more natural means of 
competition (Franck, 2014). Whilst the presence of two consecutive seasons of increasing 
competitive balance for only the second time in the data set is an encouraging sign, there is 
not currently enough data to fully support this claim, especially considering the fluctuating 
nature of the results throughout the selected time period. The results do however 
demonstrate no indication of the adverse effects critics anticipated FFP to have on 
competitive balance. 
However, there are some other elements to the results that could be indicative of an 
increasingly more competitive league. As the discussion section highlighted, the previous 
four EPL titles were won by four different teams, an occurrence never previously 
experienced during the EPL era. Furthermore, Leicester City’s EPL victory in 2015/16 made it 
the sixth club to win the league title in the EPL era, and the seventh different club to qualify 
for the top-four positions in the previous four seasons. Considering that only six different 
clubs qualified for the top-four positions between 2005/06 and 2014/15, and the previous 
stranglehold of a select few clubs over title success, this data hints at potential early shifts in 
the dynamics of EPL competition. If this hypothesis is to be true then the introduction of FFP 
regulations might even be considered the break point to a new, fifth era of competition, 
characterised by an improved competitive balance in the EPL (Lee and Fort, 2012).  
In light of these results, the regulations appear to be a positive and much-needed initiative 
for the EPL. Financial fair play regulations as a whole were designed with well-intentioned 
objectives and in order to facilitate positive change throughout European football, and as 
such they are now an important and fundamental element of modern-day football (Franck, 
2014). The most crucial issue for European football is the sustenance, and first, recovery, of 
financial balance, an issue which outweighs any desire for competitive balance (Andreff, 
2011). Thus, even if FFP initiatives had the effect of further increasing competitive 
imbalance, the need for stability and corrective action amidst the worsening financial plight 
of European football necessitated an intervention such as FFP. Besides, it is unclear whether 
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the imbalance and inequality that was evident during the first decade of the 21st century 
could be increased much further, as the EPL in particular was highly imbalanced and 
segregated (Curran et al., 2009; Pawlowski et al., 2010). Interestingly, the chance that UEFA’s 
FFP and other financial fair play regulations could in fact be contributing to increases in 
competitive balance would be a huge positive for regulations that do not state such explicit 
aims (Lindholm, 2010). 
The discussion presented throughout has purposely been written in a tentative manner due 
to the limitations that exist with this study. The use of the Herfindahl Index (and the 
standard deviation of points and Scully-Noll ratio) acts as a proxy for competitive balance, 
and because competitive balance is merely a concept and therefore cannot be measured 
directly, the results presented should not be treated as being a fully accurate representation 
of competitive balance. It follows that the conceptual nature of competitive balance means 
there exist a number of viable methods from which to assess it, all of which could potentially 
produce varying results and lead to differing conclusions. It is also the case that FFP 
regulations have only been active for five seasons, with none of the regulations yet requiring 
clubs to fully break even. As a result, the full effects of the regulations will likely not be felt 
until such time as losses are no longer permitted. Additionally, the shortage of available data 
means that any conclusions are limited in scope and can only potentially indicate the 
changing financial environment that lies ahead. These indications, however, suggest that FFP 
might in fact have a greater influence in the EPL that could lead to potentially significant 
managerial implications, beyond what was originally intended.  
New data will continue to become available every season and the regulations will 
progressively alter the financial environment in football, thus it is important that research 
continue to be conducted in this area, investigating the effects of FFP and the trends in 
competitive balance. This study confined its attention to the EPL, but it would be instructive 
to be able to compare the results from different leagues across Europe to determine the 
effects FFP regulations are having there. Significant differences exist between many of 
Europe’s football leagues and therefore FFP regulations could potentially affect individual 
leagues in very different ways. These potential differences might be significant, considering 
that the individual FFP regulations adopted by each national association are by no means 
uniform across Europe. Therefore, it is important that more research is conducted in this 
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area to discover the impact of FFP throughout Europe.  
There is evidently need for further research on this important area, that can build on the 
positive indications and insights provided by this study. If FFP regulations can achieve the 
aim of improving the financial health of European football, while assisting in increasing the 
competitive balance of a league, then their influence on European club football might be of a 
greater significance than originally expected. As Wilson’s et al. (2013) study suggested, clubs 
have moved away from the stock-market model of ownership popular during the 1990s, 
which centred around objectives of profit maximisation, towards a model of foreign 
ownership where the prioritises are the maximisation of sporting success (utility). This pivot 
towards clubs being viewed as utilities for rich benefactors or ‘sugar daddies’ was in large 
part the cause of the financial problems that beset English football prior to the introduction 
of FFP. FFP was designed to restrict the influence of benefactor money in football and 
therefore the utility maximisation model is likely to become much less viable. Wilson et al. 
(2013) indicate that the stock market ownership model, and indeed, profit maximisation 
objectives in general, contribute towards greater efficiency, a quality that is likely to become 
much more important under the auspices of financial fair play. Therefore, FFP is likely to 
encourage clubs to develop more of a balance between utility maximisation and profit 
maximisation, potentially inspiring new and innovative business models as a means of 
regaining a competitive advantage over the competition, or as Franck (2014) suggests, it 
should result in an increase of good management practice, a virtue often missing from 
modern club football.  
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Table 2: Herfindahl Index, standard deviation, and Scully-Noll ratio results 
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Figure 8: Scully-Noll ratio values 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Standard deviation values 
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